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1 INTRODUCTION 
One of the most innovative aspects of South Africa's democratisation has 
been the emergence of institutions and processes through which workers 
and unions may engage the state and capital to gain varying degrees of 
control over important economic deCisions, These features are entirely 
unprecedented when compared to old modes of economic decision-
making in South Africa, In the past workers were systematically excluded 
from such decisions except where - by dint of periodic exercise of power 
- they had won a tentative purchase in limited areas, such as wage set-
ting. Moreover, these institutions and processes are unique among devel-
oping countries undergOing democratisation, and indeed appear to have 
few precedents among advanced industrial countries with well-established 
systems of co-determination. 
Scholars and practitioners have focused attention on parts of this 
change, such as the National Economic Development and Labour Council 
(NEDLAC), or the work-place forum provisions of the Labour Relations Act, 
66 of 1995 (LRA) but they have missed its more systematiC features: its 
wide scope from the factory floor to the societal level, and the extent to 
which labour has obtained strong decision-making and consultation rights 
founded in both statute and agreement. Taken together these features of 
South Africa's transition have the potential to deepen dramatically the 
political democracy won in 1994. 
This article will focus on labour's role in extra-parliamentary economic 
institutions and will spend little time on its involvement in the formal in-
stitutions of political democracy, such as parliament. The focus is an ana-
lytical one, and should not be taken to prioritise the extra-parliamentary 
sphere as a superior form of representation. Rather, the argument advanced 
1 I wish [0 thank Jeremy Baskin, Darcy du TOit, Shane Godfrey and David JarviS for 









































• LAW, DEMOCAACY & DEVELOPMENT I 
here takes as an assumption that the deepening of democracy is depend-
ent upon strong elected democratic institutions, and cannot occur outside 
of this context. 
Oddly enough, it is these institutions' very newness which - for differ-
ent reasons - causes great hesitation among labour, business and the 
state to engage through them. Each must to some extent give up long-
standing ways of operating and accept new processes that are frighten-
ingly open-ended. Given their basis in statute and formal agreement these 
institutions promise to be more enduring than the voluntary forums that 
grew during the transition to democracy which usurped functions of the 
discredited regime, but quickly faded once a legitimate government was 
established. However, the hesitation among the actors may, sooner rather 
than later, render these institutions a dead letter. 
The research reflected in the contributions to this issue of Law. Democ-
racy and Development is a first assessment of the institutions of engage-
ment, and is by definition incomplete and tentative. The articles were 
commissioned in mid-1996 by the National Labour and Economic Devel-
opment Institute (NALEDI), a research institute associated with the Con-
gress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). In launching its long-term 
research project on co-determination and tripartism, NALEDI's aim was to 
investigate the emergence of broad processes of engagement between 
labour, the state and capital in South Africa to contribute to union pOliCY-
making in these areas. While the present collection is intended to inform a 
scholarly audience of our findings, the results were first made available to 
COSATU affiliates in a two-day workshop in late March 1998. They will 
also be disseminated to trade unionists in a workbook for union education 
efforts. 
2 NEW FORMS OF INTEREST REPRESENTATION BETWEEN 
LABOUR, THE STATE AND CAPITAL 
2.1 Corporatism, concertation, engagement: Capturing South 
African conditions 
Industrial relations reforms in the 1990s have had to look both backwards 
and forwards. One major thrust has been to make labour legislation 
consistent with the provisions of the Bill of Rights in the new constitution. 
In practice this has entailed a massive effort to eliminate discriminatory 
provisions of the old labour relations dispensation, while extending exist-
ing rights to all workers. The revision and repeal of old legislation pro-
vided an opportunity as well to look forward and create an order 
appropriate to a modern democracy at the end of the twentieth century. 
Three prominent innovations now complement the traditional emphasis 
on collective bargaining in labour law: provision for forms of joint deci-
sion-making and consultation at the work-place level; the creation of 
industry (or meso-level) accords; and the establishment of NEDLAC. At 
each level workers and their organisations have won increased control 










































ENGAGING THE STATE AND CAPITAL 
(1991: 3-4), control is taken to mean organizational and institutional 
arrangements through which ordinary workers have the power to make 
decisions affecting the processes and administration of production. It 
"implies a change in power relations from authoritarianism to a more 
democratic and egalitarian work environment." While control is generally 
focused on the work-place, this need not be the case: "The areas which 
workers may bring under their control," he argues, "and the degree to 
which they exert control in these areas, vary in different experiences and 
arrangements. " 
The multi-layered character of engagement between labour, the state, 
and capital in South Africa defies easy definition in the conceptual catego-
ries of industrial relations. In some respects the engagement takes on a 
corporatist character, in that it features "regularized peak or subpeak 
negotiation between relatively cohesive units of business and labour, with 
the formal or informal backing of the state" (Turner, 1991: 16).2 
However, trends towards corporatism are highly uneven. Not only are 
labour. the state and capital relatively disorganised when compared to the 
participants in strong corporatist systems elsewhere, but such peak level 
negotiation is firmly established in but a few industries.; Moreover. peak 
level negotiations have not subsumed plant-level processes. Centralised 
agreements tend to set minimum rather than actual wages and benefits, 
with the latter to be worked out in plant-level agreements where factory-
level unionists retain the right to negotiate and take action independently 
of their national unions. 
Nor can the system be easily described by the term co-determinist. if 
the latter is meant to suggest the development of a strong statute-based 
system of collective interest representation and participation at the work-
place. While there are certainly trends in this direction. such as Chapter 5 
of the LRA, these are distrusted by labour and remain for the moment 
relatively peripheral to traditional adversarial bargaining between shop 
stewards and employers. 
Finally, as Jeremy Baskin has argued, labour'S involvement in decision-
making extends well beyond the borders of the industrial relations system 
to include involvement in multipartite processes as diverse as university 
transformation structures. the selection of constitutional court judges. and 
(until recently) budget formulation, To capture such diversity Baskin has 
employed the term concertation, to describe a looser. less structured. 
policy bargaining arrangement (Baskin. in Friedman and de Villiers, 
1996). According to Baskin, concertation means "an institutional role for 
2 The literature on corporatism is vast. For classic interpretations. see Schmitter. 1974; 
Schmitter and Lembruch 1979; Pan itch 1986; Cawson 1986; Pek.k.arinen et al 1992. 
3 Labour is divided between three major federations, though COSATU is larger than the 
other two combined. The federations - even where organised into a single labour cau-
cus in NEDLAC - seldom speak with a single voice. and dissent within the labour cau-
cus is common. Business itself is divided on racial lines into tWO major organisations. 
Its peak-level organisations draw extremely weak mandates from their constituents, 
and have difficulty bargaining beyond a narrow range of distributive issues. Both par-










































LAW. DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
interest organisations (mainly economic) in the formulation and imple-
mentation/regulation of state policy": 
"In practice, this involves not one event or institution, but a web oj collaborative 
interchanges between state. labour and capital. It may include. but is not lim-
ited to, forms of tripartism or even multipartite institutions" (Baskin, in press) 
(emphasis added). 
For its part, COSATU resolved at its recent 6th National Congress to 
"develop strategies that engage both the state and capital for the im-
provement of the material conditions of the majority, while developing a 
long-term vision of a socialist society" (COSATU. 1998). The idea of en-
gagement has certain advantages over concertation. In particular. while it 
allows for an emphasis on working in concert towards certain mutually 
accepted goals, it also emphasises disagreement and conflict. and that the 
parties may have very different bases for seeking a concertation of inter-
ests. Engagement implies a common meeting place. not a common 
starting pOint. nor even a common end-point. For these reasons the term 
engagement will be employed here. But whatever the term, it is crucial to 
stress Baskin's emphasis on a "web of collaborative interchanges between 
state. labour and capital" which traverse every level of SOCiety. 
2.2 Engagement at enterprise level 
Chapter 5 of the LRA for the first time enabled representative unions at 
work-places with more than 100 employees to create co-determinist-type 
institutions called work-place forums, which possess broad consultative 
and decision-making powers. 
There is something of an unfortunate precedent for work-place forums 
in South African labour law. The 1953 Native Labour (Settlement of Dis-
putes) Act included a provision for works committees for African workers, 
whose representatives were directly elected by workers themselves. 
However, these bodies had no statutory rights to joint decision-making or 
consultation. and were a clear attempt at union avoidance. The same Act 
redefined the term "employee" to exclude all Africans. closing the loop-
hole through which Africans exempt from the Pass Laws were able to join 
registered unions while ruling out any Iiberalisation of labour law. Dis-
putes between works committees and employers would be automatically 
referred to hierarchical bureaucratic bodies chaired by whites appointed 
by the Minister of Labour. An even weaker body - the infamous liaison 
committee - was created in legislative revisions following the 1973 Dur-
ban strikes. Oddly enough. these structures closely resembled those 
introduced in a number of post-independence African countries that were 
intended to marginalise unions and harness workers' efforts to the project 
of national development. The Wiehahn Commission advocated the reten-
tion of a weak form of works councils that were to replace works and 
liaison committees. Though embodied in section 34A of the old Labour 
Relations Act, this recommendation remained a dead letter. 
These experiments in union avoidance - like their counterparts else-
where in Africa - generated considerable opposition from workers 










































ENGAGING THE STATEAND CAPITAL 
1991: 152ff; Rakner, 1992). They certainly contributed to black South 
African workers' enduring perception that non-union work-place struc-
tures are little more than an attempt to avoid legitimate trade union 
representation. 
Though it would be tempting to view work-place forums in this light -
and many commentators have done precisely that (Etkind, 1995; Lehul-
ere, 1996) - there are substantial differences between work-place forums 
and their counterparts elsewhere in the third world. Work-place forums 
are not compulsory institutions; indeed they may be triggered only by a 
registered trade union. Nor do they replace trade unions as workers' 
collective voice. Indeed, at NEDLAC labour won a revision in the Bill to 
allow for a variety of types of work-place fora: an employee-based model 
or a union-based model which is essentially an extension of union shop 
steward committees. Nor are work-place forums a substitute for collective 
bargaining: rather the work-place forum would have consultative and joint 
decision-making rights on a range of non-distributive issues, as well as 
extensive rights to information: 
While consultation means that an employer must, in a timely fashion, 
canvass plans with a work-place forum, decision-making power rests with 
the employer, though the latter must provide reasons to the forum for 
overriding their objections. Joint decision-making means exactly that: both 
the employer and the council make the decision, with clear and agreed 
procedures for breaking deadlocks. While one may be seen as a "soft" and 
one a "hard" form of interest representation, in practice the twO tend to 
blur. Employers are more likely to heed a forum's objections on a matter 
of consultation if they know that tomorrow they will need the same 
council's agreement on a matter of joint decision-making. 
Work-place forums introduce into South Africa what Rogers and Streeck 
(l994) call "second channel institutions": "work-place-based institutions 
for worker representation and labour-management communication". 
These complement collective bargaining by giving workers a voice in the 
governance of the shop floor and the firm, and facilitate communication 
and cooperation between management and labour on production-related 
matters, more or less free of direct distributive conflicts over wages 
(1994: 97). 
In many European countries the rights and obligations of second chan-
nel institutions ("councils") are statutorily entrenched, and may include 
powers of joint decision-making, consultation, and information sharing. 
The issues addressed by such institutions vary widely, but, according to 
Rogers and Streeck, these are largely determined by the character of 
4 The range of issues was determined at NEDLAC. For a complete list, see Satgar's 
contribution to this issue. However, the Act makes provision for a representative trade 
union and an employer to conclude a collective agreement to add or remove issues for 
consultation and joint decision-making. In essence, the division between matters to be 
decided through industry or enterprise-level collective bargaining or via joint decision-
making or consultation in a work-place forum cannot be made without the agreement 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY &. DEVELOPMENT " 
extra-firm collective bargaining. Where this is strong and centralised, 
councils are prevented from dealing directly with matters addressed in 
collective bargaining, such as wage-setting. Indeed, councils are obliged to 
uphold and monitor any collective agreements applying to their enter-
prise. This division is usually understood as a practical one which simpli-
fies councils' work and assists in building consensus with employers by 
removing from the council's scope the annual divisive negotiation over 
wages. The division in fact extends from the principle that councils should 
not be allowed to undermine centralised bargaining. By contrast, in coun-
tries with weak systems of extra-firm wage-setting, councils function like 
local trade unions, and in some cases are able to bargain over wages and 
call strikes, 
In some countries, most notably Germany. councils are established on a 
non-union basis. But this is not the case everywhere. In Italy local unions 
perform council functions. while in Sweden. which has both strong cen-
tralised bargaining and strong "second channel institutions", the latter are 
run by shop stewards. But whether or not they are union bodies. councils 
are institutions that represent collective rather than individual interests of 
workers. Insofar as they are participatory bodies they are distinct from 
managerial schemes to "involve" workers in production through, for 
example, quality circles. Significantly. councils are independent of man-
agement: they are not organised along functional production lines and stand 
outside channels of managerial authority (Rogers and Streeck, 
1994: 102).5 
Whether or not councils are union bodies, their functions are meant to 
complement centralised bargaining by taking on tasks for which central-
ised bargaining is not well suited. But "well suited" is a relative term: there 
is no fundamental division between issues appropriate for collective 
bargaining or for councils. Council competencies may include matters that 
are best decided at the level of the enterprise, such as work organisation 
and technological change. Furthermore, where extra-firm bargaining takes 
place on an annual or triennial basis, councils provide a means for ad-
dressing issues that require either constant monitoring or rapid responses. 
But there are no absolutes: matters that in Germany are decided by a non-
union works council in Sweden are determined by shop stewards; issues 
that councils decide in Spain at the work-place level are the subject of 
collective bargaining in Germany. 
The general point is that the same institutions can perform different 
functions while different institutions may perform the same functions. 
Indeed, the distinction between councils and unions in practice blurs, as 
in the modern work-place the valorisation of worker consent as a produc-
tive asset makes it increasingly impossible to separate technical and 
6 
5 For further discussions of co-determination in Europe. see Schregle 1978; Schauer 
1973; Swenson 1989; Pontussen 1988; Weiss 1986. For a discussion of workers' con-
trol. self-management and co-determination in the third world. see Bayat 1991. For the 
results of an international comparative study of worker participation. see Kester and 









































ENGAGING THE STATE AND CAPITAL 
representative processes (Streeck, 1994). On the one hand, labour move-
ments that sought to preserve their identity by eschewing council type 
institutions (as in Sweden) find their factory-level structures becoming 
"councilised". On the other hand, the non-union works councils in Ger-
many have essentially been colonised by strong centralised unions. 
Councils have helped unions to broaden their membership and power 
such that Streeck can describe them, in a well-known phrase, as the 
"extended arm of the union at the work-place." 
The public service remains a fascinating challenge to the development 
of co-determinist forms of engagement in South Africa. The public service 
was deliberately excluded from the provisions of Chapter 5, and was 
instead to be regulated for the purposes of work-place forums by a 
schedule to be promulgated by the Minister for Public Service and Admini-
stration (LRA, section 80(12); see also Satgar's and Patel's contributions to 
this issue). 
According to Patel's analysis in this collection - the first systematic as-
sessment of the issue - co-determination in the public service is both 
under- and over-developed relative to the rest of the economy. Notwith-
standing the absence of a proclamation from the Minister, institutions of 
engagement are potentially extremely widespread in the public service. 
Interesting institutional innovations in the form of transformation 
committees - have in certain instances given unions Wide-ranging effec-
tive co-determination powers at the enterprise level. These include, curi-
ously, participation in governing committees and enterprise boards. rights 
which are available in Germany, but which were not included in Chapter 
5. Furthermore, centralised bargaining in the Public Service Co-ordinating 
Bargaining Council occurs over issues that extend well beyond wage-
setting: qualitative "non-distributive issues" such as work organisation, as 
well as the restructuring of the publiC service itself. It is unclear whether 
such practices will continue, particularly given fiscal austerity and the 
trend towards commercialising the public service. Thus public service co-
determination includes work-place and sectoral transformation commit-
tees; board-level participation; and strong centralised bargaining over a 
wide array of distributive and non-distributive issues. The public service 
has produced a potentially robust version of engagement that could serve 
as a model for unions to pursue elsewhere in the economy. 
2.3 Engagement beyond the work.place: Industry accords 
If the LRA provides workers with new rights of engagement at the work-
place level. other developments provide for engagement between labour, 
capital. and the state beyond the enterprise. These trends point to the 
development of corporatist-style bargaining in South Africa (Maree, 1993; 
Baskin, 1993 and 1993a; Vally, 1992; Desai and Habib. 1996). 
The new unions of the 1970s and 1980s grew from the shop-floor. where 
they focused their organisational power around strong shop steward-con-
trolled locals capable of extracting concessions from employers in plant-
level bargaining (Friedman. 1987; Adler and Webster. 1995). This strategic 
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box unions into unfavourable conditions of employment through industry-
level bargaining in industrial councils over which the unions exerted little 
influence. Many unions had refused to participate in such structures, 
which required formal registration with the Department of Manpower. 
However, as shop-floor strength and union density grew, many unions 
reassessed this strategy and chose to challenge management in industrial 
councils.' Since the late 1980s centralised bargaining has in fact become a 
core demand of the labour movement and a major point of contention 
between labour and capital in revising the LRA. 
However, the unions' move towards centralised bargaining unleashed a 
series of organisational problems which have never been fully resolved. 
The need to combine disparate local demands into a common negotiating 
position created the possibility of destructive and embarrassing defections 
from the central bargain (Von Holdt, 1990). Furthermore, the skilled staff 
required to conduct the negotiations generated tensions for a movement 
that had long prioritised the power of elected semi-skilled worker leaders 
over full-time officials. These tensions between the centre and local re-
main: Marie (1995, 1992) traces the widely acknowledged and chronic 
weakening of locals in large part to these original centralising tendencies. 
Nonetheless, increased centralisation remains an imperative, compelling 
COSATU to identify an even more vexing problem: the creation of larger 
affiliates through the merger of existing unions along broad sectorallines.7 
In the early 1990s COSATU's strongest affiliates were able to use their 
power to engage with broad questions of industry restructuring. This issue 
had been placed on the agenda as a result of South Africa's impending 
reintroduction into global markets as a consequence of politiCal demo-
cratisation. The adjustment reqUired would be enormous, given the long 
hiStory of protectionism associated with import substitution industrialisa-
tion. Unions feared that such adjustment would occur on neoliberal terms, 
entailing massive job loss unless they developed appropriate restructuring 
plans and the institutional means for establishing these as government 
policy. Thousands of jobs were at stake in the clothing and textile, auto-
mobile, and mining industries. These were not only the largest sectors in 
manufacturing and among the most densely organised, but the unions in 
these sectors were COSATU's most powerful. 
In the years prior to the 1994 elections the unions sought to ensure that 
industrial policy would be developed on a tripartite basis by government, 
business, and organised labour. While the "mining summit" of the early 
1 990s largely stalled, efforts in the other two sectors ultimately produced 
agreements.s The unions were able to bring capital to the negotiating 
8 
6 For an assessment of the Metal and Allied Workers' Union's deciSion [0 enter the 
Industrial Council. see Webster (I 985}. 
7 For a frank diSCUSSion of the difficulties of accomplishing this feat, see COSATU 1997 
and J997a. 
8 Pressures for an accord in mining were revived in early 1998 due to the continuing fall 
in the gold price and employers' plans for widespread retrenchments in the industry. 
The establishment of a tripartite Gold Crisis Committee provides an opportunity for the 









































ENGAGING THE STATE AND CAPITAL 
table. in large part because the employers were as threatened as the 
unions by restructuring. Furthermore, the unions were able to impose 
corporatism on the weakened apartheid state which feared the disruptive 
political effects rapid restructuring would generate. and saw agreements 
with capital and labour as a means to gain some legitimacy for itself. 
According to Hirschsohn et al. "The political transition thus created a 
unique opportunity for the three social partners to develop and implement 
consensus based industrial policies to restructure their industries to ensure 
their long term viability" (1997: I). But they stress that the unions - rather 
than the state or business - drove the process by virtue of their ability 
to develop creative policies and to realise these through a combination 
of skilled negotiators backed up by their organisations' mobilisational 
power. 
In both industries the three parties agreed progressively to reduce tariffs 
and rapidly integrate South African industry into the global economy; in 
return both labour and capital sought numerous supply-side inputs. includ-
ing retraining and trade incentives. to offset the likely shocks of adjust-
ment (Hirschsohn et al. 1997). In addition. they sought the creation of 
industry authorities to implement these measures and to monitor prog-
ress. In principle these agreements provided workers with substantial 
powers to restructure their industries according to their own agendas. 
rather than responding reactively to adjustment imposed from without. 
However. engagement over industrial policy is flawed in that the insti-
tutions through which engagement occurs are not statutorily based, but 
depend on the good will of the participants. The parties - most especially 
government were not bound by the agreements produced. Indeed. once 
in power, the ANC government "cherry-picked" both the clothing and 
textile and automobile agreements. endorsing those aspects consistent 
with the poliCies of the Department of Trade and Industry. such as tariff 
reduction. while rejecting those that meant increased state expenditure or 
the creation of multipartite implementation and monitoring authorities 
which could usurp state functions. While COSATU could impose corpora-
tism on the weakened National Party government, it could not achieve the 
same result with a legitimate government. even one headed by its alliance 
parmer! 
2.4 Engagement beyond the work~place: NEDLAC 
Most significantly. and in contrast with the experience of engagement in 
industry restructuring. another Act of parliament extended and entrench-
ed workers' rights to engagement at the level of the society as a whole. 
The National Economic Development and Labour Council Act (Act 35 of 
consensual restructuring and downscaling of the industry while ameliorating the extent 
of job losses. The mining summit also yielded a major advance in the area of health 
and safety, though this came about less through the tripartite process and more 
through the Leon CommiSSion into health and safety in the industry and the work of 










































LAW,DEMOCRAcY& DEVELOpMENT··· .. 
1 994) provides labour and other collective actors with unprecedented 
rights to shape a range of government policies. 9 
According to Gostner and Joffe, in their article in this issue, with the 
transition to democracy in the early 1990s the unions sought a dramatic 
extension of corporatist-style initiatives to questions of broad social policy. 
Though this was in some ways a logical development of labour's efforts to 
increase worker control over decision-making at the centre, Gostner and 
Joffe argue that the unions were primarily motivated by the goal of pre-
venting the government and business from undertaking unilateral restruc-
turing of the economy prior to the election of an ANC government (see 
also Schreiner, 1991; Friedman and Shaw, in press; Webster, 1995; Adler 
and Webster, 1997). 
For much the same reasons that labour was able to win the co-operation 
of capital and the state on industry restructuring, the unions succeeded in 
drawing both parties into a tripartite National Economic Forum in the 
dying days of the old regime (Friedman and Shaw, in press). Rather than 
fading away with the installation of a new regime, the NEF and the Na-
tional Manpower Commission, a policy advisory body created under the 
Wiehahn reforms. were replaced by NEDLAC. Though labour's ability to 
achieve its goals in NEDLAC has been uneven, the Council provides the 
opportunity for wide ranging interventions on the most important gov-
ernment poliCies. These possibilities are not only a radical departure in 
South Africa, but are largely unprecedented in the world, especially given 
the trend towards neoliberal deregulation. 
Why should engagement have become so common in South Africa? The 
next section will explore a number of general explanations for its develop-
ment. 
3 EXPLAINING ENGAGEMENT: PASSING FASHION OR 
ENDURING FEATURE? 
Engagement is not simply the latest managerial vogue, nor an obsession 
of the ministerial legislative drafting team that developed the LRA. The 
emergence of co-determinist and more broadly multipartite processes is 
part and parcel of the broader transition to democracy in South Africa 
which has prioritised practices of bargaining and pacting between op-
posed societal interests. Such co-operation - and the inherent compro-
mises on which it hinges - was a necessary condition for transition under 
9 Representation at NEDLAC includes members who represent organised business. 
organised labour. organised community and development interests, and the Slate. Ac-
cording to the Act (section 5(1» NEDLAC shall: "(a) strive to promote the goals of eco-
nomic growth, participation in economic decision-making and social equity; (b) seek to 
reach consensus and conclude agreements on matters pertaining to social and eco-
nomic policy: (c ) consider all proposed labour legislation relating to labour market 
policy before it is introduced in Parliament; (d) conSider all significant changes to social 
and economic policy before it is implemented or introduced in Parliament; (el encour-











































ENGAGING THE STATE AND CAPITAL 
conditions of political stalemate. In this sense, engagement is an era-
bound product, precipitated by the exigencies of collaboration between 
an illegitimate state which governed but did not rule and a legitimate 
democratic opposition which ruled but did not govern. However, where 
most transitional multipartite bargaining withered away after the election 
of a legitimate government, engagement between labour, the state and 
capital has survived the negotiated settlement that gave it such a strong 
impetus. 'o 
There are four main reasons why these fora have endured. First, South 
Africa's transition to democracy has coincided with the advance of globali-
sation and new forms of competition in the international political econ-
omy. Locally this has posed the simultaneous challenges of democratisa-
tion amidst profound economic restructuring. Given its historical strength 
and the imminent threat to its members' interests, the labour movement 
vaulted into negotiation with business and the state over the form and 
pace of restructuring. But as described above, both the state and capital -
for different reasons had an interest in some form of engagement over 
these same issues. 
Similar processes are occurring at enterprise level. Market demand for 
quality puts a premium on employee performance while new forms of 
work organisation allow for the potential decentralisation of decision-
making and increase employees' influence over work. In many sectors 
management cannot simply tell employees what to do, but must trust 
them not to misuse their increased discretion. One approach is to increase 
employees' commitment to the enterprise, and many managements have 
undertaken some elements of organisational restructuring aimed at in-
creasing "employee involvement" and other forms of co-operation (Streeck, 
1992; Rogers and Streeck, 1994). Such initiatives are tied to extensive 
adjustment aimed at improving productivity and competitiveness, and 
have often brought with them demands for retrenchment and wage 
restraint. In other words. engagement has persisted because many em-
ployers themselves desire that it continue as an adjunct to their develop-
ment strategies, albeit with important limitations on the nature and extent 
of participation. 
Second. notwithstanding their refusal to participate in statutory struc-
tures during the apartheid era, most of the unions that emerged in the 
1970s and 1980s were committed to a vision of socialist transformation. 
and advocated the radical extension of worker control at the enterprise. 
industrial, and societal levels. Though the principled policy of "militant 
abstentionism" during the anti-apartheid struggle emphasised minimum 
co-operation with the state and capital (though it did not exclude routine 
collective bargaining and even registration under the LRA), with the onset 
of the transition to democracy labour gave force to its commitment to 
worker control (Von Holdt. 1991 and 1991a). While there are some ambi-
gUities about the approach, labour sought direct engagement with the 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
state and capital at the national and industrial sectoral levels." If business 
sought to make contact with labour over certain limited forms of co-operation, 
then labour - in pursuit of worker control - sought engagement with busi-
ness and the state. 
Third, engagement has grown out of and has been sustained by the 
regular. institutionalised interactions between organised labour and busi-
ness founded in the employment relationship. This relationship. exempli-
fied by the welter of recognition agreements. industrial councils and other 
institutions of the industrial relations system. existed prior to the transi-
tion itself. Engagement is thus rooted in the extensive and long-entrench-
ed relationship between labour and capital which is formally independent 
of political parties and the state. '2 The historical embeddedness of en-
gagement between labour and capital in capitalist relations of production 
constrains the options available to the state for unilateral restructuring of 
the economy and SOCiety. Indeed, the new LRA has significantly bolstered 
the industrial relations system and its independence from the state. 
Finally, most multipartite transitional negotiating processes emerged 
due to the crisis in legitimacy of the apartheid state and existed on a 
voluntaristic basis, with unstable and shifting membership. By contrast, 
the cornerstones of institutional engagement between labour, capital and 
the state - NEDLAC and work-place forums - are enshrined in law. The 
existence of such fora and the rights conferred upon them do not depend 
primarily on the exercise of power by the participants; rather, the power 
of the participants enabled the creation of entrenched powers that will 
maintain the institution even if the. parties' strength wanes. Gostner and 
Joffe argue in their contribution to this issue that the NEDLAC Act gives 
labour and business the right to influence the policy process and therefore 
the sorts of policy that government adopts before legislation goes to 
parliament. As such, labour need only mobilise in those instances in which 
negotiations deadlock, as it no longer has to expend considerable re-
sources on getting a place at the table. 
In engagement is not simply a passing fashion, it may be too soon to 
declare that it is an enduring feature. It is important to survey the difficul-
ties each party has with engagement, to which the discussion now turns. 
1 I The ambiguities concern whether engagement in fora such as the National Manpower 
Commission and National Economic Forum was purely defensive in orientation 
blocking the apartheid state's ability to embark on unilateral restructuring of the econ-
omy - or whether it Included a proactive element of involvement in policy making. 
Friedman and Shaw (in press) tease out the complications of labou(s position: in es-
sence it attempted to do both by furthering the ANC's (and its own) short-term agenda 
by blocking state economic policy, while seeking to achieve certain long-term gains by 
participating in agreements. While the latter produced some important results advan-
tageous to workers, the largely defensive posture of blocking unilateral restructuring 
"interfered with pursuing a longer term transformative agenda." Either way. engage-
ment was a function of a strategy of extending worker controL 
12 This independence is extremely important: neither labour nor business owe their 
organisational status to the state; nor is either party - most significantly labour de-
pendent on the state or the ANC for its funding, leaderShip selection, or for decisions to 










































ENGAGlNG THE STATE AND CAPlTAL 
4 ENGAGEMENT: A DUBIOUS ACHIEVEMENT? 
If one speaks to a trade unionist elsewhere in Africa or his or her counter-
part in Asia or North America. they will express deep envy at the forms of 
engagement available to South African unions. Indeed, unionists else-
where have spent considerable time studying the NEDLAC Act and the 
new LRA while strategising how to achieve similar gains in their own 
countries. Yet one of the most intriguing ironies of the experience of 
engagement in South Africa is that, while each party has reason to be 
thankful for its existence. engagement generates little enthusiasm among 
its putative beneficiaries, most especially labour. 
Indeed, at critical moments each party has opted out of engagement 
when it suited their interests to do so. As Gostner and Joffe demonstrate, 
NEDLAC has been particularly prone to such defections. The unions 
bypassed the council by insisting on treating the restructuring of state 
assets as a bilateral issue between them and government. Business judges 
that it can better secure its interests by qUietly lobbying friendly govern-
ment politicians and senior civil servants than by entering complicated 
negotiations in NED LAC over macro-economic fundamentals. For its part, 
government treated GEAR as a non-negotiable issue. and maneuvered to 
ensure that it was never formally discussed in NEDLACs Public Finance 
and Monetary Policy chamber. According to Hirschsohn et at (1997), 
government has similarly refused to be bound by industry restructuring 
accords. unilaterally rejecting crucial items in the clothing and textile and 
automobile industry agreements thereby eroding their effectiveness. 
Each party resembles a prosecutor or defence attorney "shopping" for 
the most suitable judge to hear their case. Rather than being bound by 
decisions that limit their options, the parties seek another venue where an 
unpopular result can be overturned as if on appeal. I n this respect en-
gagement serves not to bind parties to unfavourable outcomes, but is 
more or less an extension by other means of a zero-sum adversarial 
bargaining process. 
By definition, engagement cannOt allow any actor to maximise his re-
wards. It is rather a way of producing compromises: sub-optimal. or 
"least-worst" outcomes (Baskin. 1998: 18). Ambivalences arise, however. 
because engagement is a deeply contested concept with different mean-
ings for each actor. On labour's side, advances towards involvement in 
decision-making appear to satisfy long-standing goals to deepen worker 
control and constrain both capital's and the state's unilateral decision-
making power. As Satgar argues in his article in this issue, the LRA's 
provisions allowing for the establishment of a work-place forum through 
agreement between employers and a representative trade union hold out 
the possibility for a radical extension of worker control. In addition to 
expanding the areas of jOint decision-making beyond those identified in 
section 81 (1) of the Act, he identifies the possibility of including within the 
agreement an autonomous self-management competency which goes 











































I LAW, DEMOCRACY &. DEVELOPMENT 
But these very possibilities threaten managerial prerogatives and heighten 
capital's fears that engagement is labour's Trojan Horse that must at all 
costs be kept outside the gates. Hence, for the most part, as Godfrey, 
Hirschsohn and Maree show in their contribution to this issue, managers 
embrace limited forms of work-place-level decision-making, which are 
yoked to their pre-existing plans for achieving competitiveness. Except in 
cases where unions are well organised and assertive, employers seek to 
restrict engagement to forms they believe to be functional to their overall 
agenda. Similarly, Webster and Macun, in their contribution to this issue, 
argue that with few exceptions - existing forms of work-place represen-
tation amount to soft forms of consultation developed in response to firm-
threatening crises. Such fora's powers are ambiguous, and are seldom 
institutionalised. The existing cases, Webster and Macun report, fall well 
short of jOint decision-making, as in the final instance power rests with 
management, and come close to Pateman's (1970) famous description of 
pseudo participation. 
Thus, capital has its own imperatives for embracing forms of participa-
tion: to incorporate labour into their chosen strategies for increasing 
efficiency and competitiveness. To a great extent this imperative is shared 
by the state. As Du Toit (1995) points out, the Minister of Labour. when 
launching the Draft Labour Relations Bill, described worker participation 
as "'more than a moral or ethical imperative' situated within 'parameters 
of equity and social justice.'" However, the Act eventually passed by 
parliament does not give precedence to this democratising and empower-
ing intention, and prioritises instead that work-place forums "must seek to 
enhance efficiency in the work-place." (LRA, section 79(b)) "Such an 
explicit directive," Du Toit argues: 
"will be binding on a court in a way that a general statement of intent by a 
minister is not. The implication is that economic efficiency must take prece-
dence over the requirements of democracy and that. if 'efficiency' (as under-
stood by a court) demands it. workers' rights to be involved in decision-making 
must be curtailed, An alternative approach",would be to seek a syntheSiS: a 
system of work-place governance designed to enhance democracy as well as 
efficiency, in mutually reinforcing ways .. ,,,13 
These orientations on the part of capital and the state activate labour'S 
fears that engagement - despite certain advantages - will ensure their 
incorporation on unfavourable terms within capitalism and undermine 
their programmatiC commitment to a socialist transformation. In this 
sense engagement is perceived by labour as capital's Trojan Horse. Thus. 
in spite of advances that have created an unprecedented expansion of 
labour'S potential power over decision-making. these opportunities have 
been met with considerable scepticism - even rejection - in the ranks of 
labour (see Buhlungu. 1996). 
13 It is worth stressing that the NEDLAC Act (section 5(1)) more successfully achieves the 
balancing act Du Toit calls for by giving equal weight to "the goals of economic growth. 
participation in economic decision-making and social equity," It is unclear why the LRA 










































ENGAGING THE STATE AND CAPITAL 
But the state's reservations about engagement do not coincide entirely 
with those of capital. Without denying the attractions of bringing labour 
"on board" a programme of increasing competitiveness, the state, too 
has reasons to fear that engagement will indeed be a Trojan Horse for 
both labour and capital. Engagement could well enable both to usurp the 
state's constitutional prerogatives by infringing on its sovereign right 
to make and implement laws. Where this infringement was inevitable 
during the transition to democracy (indeed, it may be argued, such power 
sharing was a necessary condition for transition) its attractions for a 
democratically elected government are greatly reduced, particularly 
given that the new parliament and other democratic institutions remain 
unconsolidated." 
Buttressed by a popular mandate and equipped with policy-making ca-
pacity, the ANC government has far less need than its predecessor to heed 
either business or labour (Friedman and Shaw, in press). This does not 
mean that the state is free to ignore either, though with increasing fre-
quency ministers and senior civi! servants defend state autonomy in 
policy-making by invoking pluralist notions of parliamentary sovereignty. 
These could be the harbinger of a retreat from engagement. Indeed, as 
mentioned above. the government effectively blocked NEDLAC from 
considering macro-economic policy, though it must be stressed that such 
insulation was not aimed solely at labour. but extended to the ANC itself 
as well as civil society formations. '5 
The NALEDI research project thus arrived at an awkward conclusion. 
One can point to important trends towards engagement at the work-place. 
industry. and societal levels. but it is far more difficult to identify who is 
responsible for such innovations. since none of the participants are un-
ambiguous champions of engagement. 
5 ASSESSING LABOUR'S ENGAGEMENT WITH CAPITAL AND 
THE STATE 
In one respect it is clearly too early to conduct a proper assessment of 
engagement. Similar institutions have evolved over decades in western 
Europe and labour. capital and the state have each taken consider-
able time to develop appropriate strategies for using them. Without resort-
ing to a score-card approach. it is possible. nonetheless to identify certain 
trends. 
14 In this context. both parliament and the extra-parliamentary institutions of engagement 
may well be threatened by the growing power of the executive. Given that the apart-
heid state granted central state authorities massive formal and informal power any 
democratic project must address the restructuring of the relationship between the ex-
ecutive and representative institutions. 
15 It is not clear to what extent organised South African capital was involved in GEAR's 
formulation. but the direct involvement of World Bank economists is rather eaSier to 











































LAW, DEMoCRACY & DEVELoPMENT 
5.1 Building organisation: Strong unions enable strong 
engagement and vice~versa 
Gostner and Joffe report that labour has proven particularly effective at 
using NEDLAC in a defensive mode to block certain policies unpalatable to 
them. But defensive responses are only a small part of the potential gains 
to be had from engagement. The unions have not been able to realise fully 
the possibilities for building organisation by extending union membership. 
Such outcomes have been attained in Germany, where unions have 
colonised supposedly non-union works councils and have brought their 
leaders and employees into union membership. While formally non-union 
structures, works councils tend to rely on unions to provide research and 
other support in their dealings with employers, and in this interaction 
councilors usually become converted to the cause of unionism. Further-
more, unions have used rights of access to co-determined work-places (for 
example, the right to attend works council meetings and the right to call 
for elections to establish a works council) to recruit new members. Given 
the symbiotic relationship between councils and unions, the election of a 
works council in practice amounts to a union recognition procedure 
(Streeck, 1992: 153; Streeck, 1994a). 
Much of the skepticism around work-place forums revolves around un-
ion fears that they will not only incorporate unions into capitalism, but will 
undercut the most important union structure: the shop stewards commit-
tee. The LRA's acceptance of a union-based work-place forum helps allay 
these fears. But it is also crucial to recall that "second channel" institutions 
can operate through a multiplicity of forms. It is therefore necessary to 
reflect on ways to marry "second channel" type interventions with the 
traditional structures of shop stewards committees, combining bargaining 
with the more consensus-building practices associated with co-deter-
mination. It is unclear at present exactly how union and work-place 
institutions can be combined. More research and debate, as well as well-
chosen experiments on the ground can advance our understanding in this 
crucial area. This includes finding ways of functionally differentiating 
"those issues which are too complex and detailed to be given proper 
consideration in the context of annual negations from those which are 
not" (Lagrange, 1995). 
5.2 New use of power 
The distinction between defensive blocking maneuvers and proactive 
involvement in policy-making implies a subtle shift in notions of power 
embraced by all three parties. Friedman and Shaw (in press) argue that 
industrial relations in South Africa has been underpinned by "realist" 
notions of power, defined as "an actor's ability to impose its will, regard-
less of resistance." By contrast, creative policy-making depends upon the 
use of communicative action power which is the ability to "act in concert" 
with others. Power here rests on securing the voluntary consent of other 
actors. If "realist power" concerns the division of existing capacities within 
society, "'communicative action,'" they argue, "is about creating new 










































ENGAGlNG THE STATE AND CAPITAL 
Realist notions of power will continue to be important, not only because 
this is an inherited tradition, but because the oppressive conditions that in 
the past generated such conflicts will remain for the foreseeable future. 
Engagement - defensive and proactive - demands the use of both forms 
of power. Friedman and Shaw however stress, "the challenge of using the 
one while retaining the other is substantial and unions' experience equips 
them for it only partially at best." Engagement demands of union leaders, 
Friedman and Shaw conclude, 
"that they find both a strategic and a rhetorical balance between continued 
adversarialism and new forms of cooperation. If the balance is found at all, the 
quest will not be easy. And damaging failures to find it seem almost inevitable" 
(Friedman and Shaw, in press).'" 
5.3 Legislative entrenchment 
The statutory entrenchment of institutions is an important condition for 
the deepening of engagement. Certainly, entrenchment does not guaran-
tee that the parties will take engagement seriously - as witnessed by the 
government's unwillingness to subject GEAR to consideration at NEDLAC 
- but it does greatly increase the likelihood that the institutions them-
selves will continue and that agreements reached therein will be binding. 
As Webster and Macun show, informal work-place engagement was 
largely a crisis-driven response by powerful personalities on both sides 
who were converted to the wisdom of negotiated solutions. When the 
crisis wanes, or individuals move on, or firms change direction the institu-
tions themselves tend to crumble. A similar lesson may be drawn from 
the experience of COSATU unions in developing accords on industry 
restructuring. 
5.4 Capacity 
A1I sides lack research, administrative, and personnel capacity to engage 
effectively, but the problems are most extreme in the unions, and are 
increasingly acknowledged (COSATU. 1997 and 1997a). A decline in 
servicing members is obvious, stemming largely from resource problems 
in many affiliates. Some are unable to fund necessary functions such as 
training for shop stewards and officials, and in many prominent cases 
business is taking on the function of educating union factory representa-
tives. These capaCity problems are important because they directly affect 
union power. If management is training shop stewards or as bad, if no 
16 In contrast to those state officials looking to end or downgrade engagement, the Director 
General of the Department of Labour, Sipho Pityana has recently made a sophisticated 
assessment of the possibilities and problems of engagement. In distinguishing NEDLAC 
from collective bargaining between labour, capital and the state he has called instead 
for "the three parties together [to] define a vision of what South Africa must be trans-
formed into." AI! policies including those from business and labour - should be up for 
discussion. but with a clear focus on desired outcomes. tied to extensive and collabo-
rative research (Pityana 1997. 1997a). These ideas come very close to Friedman's and 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY &. DEVELOPMENT •..••. 
training is occurring - the unions risk compromising their power, which is 
ultimately founded on the political sophistication. mobiJisational ability 
and mandates of shop floor workers and their shop stewards. 
If union education efforts are weak, their research capabilities are even 
more constrained, notwithstanding the development since 1993 of 
NALEDI. The economic research capacity in even a single quasi-state 
institution - such as the Development Bank of Southern Africa - com-
pletely dwarfs the total research capacity at labour's disposal. 
Unfortunately, multiple layers of engagement demand that education 
and research capacity be radically expanded. Without this unions are 
likely to find themselves either blocking initiatives from capital and the 
state or meekly agreeing out of ignorance or for want of alternatives. In 
this context the silence in the LRA over provision of appropriate funding 
for training members of work-place forums is cause for considerable 
concern. In many European countries provision for funding of training by 
employers is an essential feature of "second channel institutions." The 
lack of similar arrangements here - where the impact of a racist education 
system heavily advantages capital - threatens the viability of all forms of 
engagement. 
5.5 Strategic vision 
A (partial!) list of commitments made at the recent COSATU Congress 
include campaigns for: living wage; paid maternity and family leave; 
restructuring UIF; child care facilities; a social security net for all; mone-
tary and fiscal policies that enhance growth and employment creation: 
public sectOr restructuring; tariff reduction; a viable public works pro-
gramme; fair regional labour standards; organisational renewal; changing 
the country's electoral system; transformation of the police and justice 
system; fighting globalisation (COSATU. 1998). 
COSATU has made gains in many of these areas, and these goals are 
individually admirable. Taken together. however, they are well beyond 
any movement's capacity. particularly one with the problems mentioned 
above. In many respects labour has become a shadow government, 
developing poliCies in every conceivable area of interest to the working 
class. 
This wide agenda is a symptom of deeper strategiC problems. The la-
bour movement has not decided which activities take precedence. nor 
ranked its involvement with anyone campaign. If organisations cannot 
make these choices on a deliberate basis. they risk doing many things 
badly rather than a few things well. This is the opposite of strategiC action. 
If they are unable to establish specific goals. differentiate short. medium. 
and long-term objectives. and marshal scarce resources to achieve them 
unions risk lapsing into what the September Commission on the Future of 
the Unions labelled "zig-zag" unionism: a reactive unionism, lurching from 
one issue to another as they pop up (COSATU, 1997). 
This is evident in NEDLAC where. as Gostner and Joffe argue. with a few 










































ENGAGING THE STATE AND CAPITAL 
The process is driven by White Papers or draft legislation usually drawn 
up in relative isolation by government with both labour and capital com-
pelled either to oppose or to amend proposals at the edges. The first may 
lead to breakdown; the second to marginalisation, whereby labour accepts 
to work within someone else's plan. Indeed, government not only tends to 
define what goes on the agenda. but what is kept out of the forum (most 
importantly, GEAR). 
Gostner and Joffe call instead for clarity in strategic vision as a prereq-
uisite to the effective use of NEDLAC, though the same point can be made 
about engagement at the other two levels. Labour cannot maximise its 
opportunities because it is unsure how to deploy its scarce resources 
wisely, nor does it know how to link its efforts at NEDLAC with those at 
the other two levels. The huge and highly technical agenda of discussions 
in fora such as NEDLAC, combined with weakened links between leaders 
and members means that these discussions cannot be widely debated 
throughout the organisation. With a relatively uninformed membership, 
how can the massive power of the unions be mobilised to achieve the 
organisation's goals? 
Thus the problem of strategic clarity has as its parallel the growth of 
what the South African Communist Party's Jeremy Cronin (1992) has 
called the tap theory of protest: turning the mobilisation off or on as 
determined by the ebb and flow of a very distant negotiation process. This 
development has serious implications for democracy. How pOSSibly can 
members follow, let alone exercise democratic control over decisions if 
these are made in far-away locations and are sealed by agreements 
brokered between top leaders? A membership that did not partiCipate in 
agreements made at any of the three levels will be unlikely to feel bound 
by them, and a labour movement that cannot ensure that agreements 
stick will be unlikely to command the respect of either capital or the state. 
These problems could result - as COSATU's secretariat acknowledged in 
its report to the 6th National Congress - in the "strategic initiative passing 
into the hands of those opposed to fundamental transformation," and to 
the rollback of gains made during the apartheid era and since 1994 
(COSATU, 1997a). 
5.6 Transformation 
Aside from labour's pragmatiC concerns about engagement, lurking in the 
background is a very palpable principled objection. For many South 
African unionists the historical reference point for both co-determination 
and corporatism is European social democracy, where they are seen to 
have contributed to labour's incorporation into capitalism. What is more 
often neglected is that both co-determination and corporatism have also 
come at a cost to capital, that they continue to yield significant benefits for 
employed workers and union members, and that they have not meant the 
extinction of labour'S independence. 
Corporatism, in particular, has been associated with union success in 
weathering the storm of globalisation. According to Turner, in the period 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT .' 
decline and the stability of industrial relations systems are largely deter-
mined by two critical variables: 
"The extent to which unions, as a broad national pattern, are integrated into 
processes of managerial decision-making, especially concerning work reorgani-
sation; and second, the existence of laws or corporatist bargaining arrange-
ments that regulate firm-level union participation from outside the firm" 
(1991 12). 
The necessity of reaching agreement between management and workers 
helps ensure that even far-reaching restructuring programmes take into 
account both market imperatives and the representation of workers' 
interests. It also means that workers have an independent base from 
which to assess company needs, giving them the potential to develop a 
"worker-oriented vision of the shape of new work organisation." At the 
same time. the existence of corporatist bargaining arrangements outside 
the enterprise "narrows managerial discretion" and ensures that "both 
management and labour ... are pushed from without toward collabora-
tion ... " (Turner, 1992: 12-13). 
It is not coincidental that such integrated systems strongly correlate 
with those cases (e g Sweden, Germany) where unions have succeeded in 
maintaining membership through the economic storms of the 1980s and 
1990s (Turner. 1991; Rogers and Streeck, 1994; Streeck, 1994). In an era 
in which unions are generally on the defenSive, advantages which enable 
them to maintain their size and integrity are extremely important. 
Moreover. Streeck (1992) argues that co-determination has resulted in a 
double incorporation. It has certainly increased labour's identification with 
management's goals. though it is important to stress that co-operation 
does not exclude serious conflict between labour and capital. But it has 
also fundamentally changed the way firms deal with labour. Given the 
constraints co-determination imposes on manpower policy (e g retrench-
ments and training) firms cannot easily take on or shed labour as market 
conditions would normally dictate. The organisational rigidities in co-
determined firms have in part achieved the decommodification of labour 
"in effect reduc[ing] the dependence of employment on the product market 
and ... turn[ingJ labour. within limits, from a dependent into an independent 
or even constant factor. For many practical purposes labour in co-determined 
enterprises is almost as difficult and costly to dispose of as fixed capital. In this 
sense the status of capital and labour as factors of production has been made 
more similar (1992: 159). Thus co-determination has resulted in the subtle 
transformation of the nature of capitalist relations of production". 
Still. the gains identified above have come within a capitalist framework. 
What remains unanswered is the extent to which engagement today can 
be translated into a means towards longer term processes of transforma-
tion. Though the tendency may be strong for engagement to become an 
end-in-itself rather than a means towards transformation, it would be a 
mistake to see labour's incorporation as a one-way relationship entirely 
functional to capital. 
Engagement can bring about workers' empowerment by eqUipping 
them with skills beyond their specific knowledge. particularly regarding 










































i?NGAG1NG THE STATE AND CAPITAL 
these capabilities workers will be less able to move beyond a traditionally 
narrow bargaining agenda, as core functions of the firm will remain 
opaque, even in a context of thorough information disclosure, Further-
more, the opportunities provided by engagement would allow workers to 
intervene early in policy issues, and perhaps contribute to approaches that 
would avoid problems such as retrenchments. In such a fashion workers 
could move beyond reactive and defensive responses to capital's initia-
tives and mistakes. In the longer term, engagement contains the possibil-
ity, outlined above, of usurping managerial functions, the Trojan Horse of 
co-determination most feared by capital. 
These arguments mesh well with COSATU's September Commission's 
recommendations for transforming the economy (COSATU, 1997), The 
Commission's economic vision portrays labour as both the major bearer 
of the public interest in industrial development, and the bearer of the 
majority interest in redistribution and social justice. The vision attempts to 
reconcile short-term defence of worker interests with a longer-term strat-
egy of economic transformation that includes: 
• Restructuring the public seCtor to deliver better services; to serve as a 
source of productive investment in strategically important areas; and 
to serve as the cutting edge of work-place democratisation; 
• socialising the investment function through reintroducing prescribed 
assets a requirement that enterprises invest in specified developmen-
tal areas; 
• using union investment companies to build "a social sector" of co-
operatives; 
• transforming the private sector into a "stakeholder sector" where "no 
longer only the rights of shareholders prevail. but also the needs of 
workers, communities and SOciety". 
These goals in turn are unachievable except through the processes dis-
cussed above. The Commission acknowledges this in its call for "strategic 
engagement." But it did not fully perceive the multi-layered character of 
labour's engagement and the opportunities it provides for advancing in a 
more co-ordinated fashion at each of the three levels the Commission's 
integrated development agenda, 
It is worth registering a caveat: labour's aspirations to represent a 
broader constituency of the exploited need to be examined critically. 
Many assessments of engagement in South Africa have characterised it as 
a concern of the relatively well-off. Bird and Schreiner once argued for an 
inclusive multipartite version of corporate (collective) bargaining. compris-
ing also "civics. women's groups, associations of the unemployed and the 
aged, consumer and rural organisations ... " (Bird and Schreiner 1992: 
28-29 and 32). 
To an extent this problem is addressed in NED LAC's development 
chamber which includes community based organisations alongside labour, 
business and the state. But this sector is at best weakly represented at 
NEDLAC and does not provide an appropriate counter-weight to the other 










































l.AW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
are large numbers of poor and oppressed South Africans whom the civics 
and trade unions do not represent and who are outside any significant 
radical popular initiative" (Harris, 1993: 95). By their absence such group-
ings ensure that solutions to South Africa's problems of political and 
economic transition are less likely to meet their peculiar circumstances 
and needs. 
[n response, Jarvis and Sitas argue in their contribution to this issue for 
a more encompassing "social co-determination" that goes beyond tradi-
tional shop floor-based co-determination (as in western Europe) to include 
constituencies other than labour and capital in processes integrating 
production and distribution decisions. While identifying a need for the 
state to co-ordinate and plan development, they call for new national, 
regional and local "grids of decision-making." Work-place co-determin-
ation mistakenly assumes that decisions can be isolated from broader 
societal interests. But who should "co-determine" a firm's decision to open 
or close a plant in a particular region? Who has an interest in addressing 
possible environmental effects or the impact of hiring strategies on local 
labour markets? "A plurality of interests," they argue "need to shape 
together the 'co' side of our economic decisions": 
"We need to in other words find a new agency for determination that is not 
"univocal" but "multivocal." A return to centrist. commandist and dictatorial 
Forms of organisation is undesirable. A collapse of all determination into a re-
born "marketism" is also undesirable. By social co-determination we are sign-
posting the need for an economic system that is accountable to social and civic 
needs. And this accountability demands new forms of "co-decision"-making". 
In this respect, arguments for engagement return full circle to the issue of 
deepening democracy. The forms of participation called for by Jarvis and 
Sitas cannot be accomplished through the formal institutions of represen-
tative democracy alone. Not only do these lack the power to regulate the 
economic system, on the terms of Jarvis's and Sitas's argument it would 
be undesirable for them to acquire such power. Rather, such participation 
depends upon a creative mix between parliament (and regional and local 
legislative assemblies) and bodies that ensure the direct participation of 
civil society groups in economic decision-making, implementation and 
monitoring. The institutional forms through which this could be accom-
plished, their competencies, and the division of labour between them 
remain unclear at present. 
Such participation would have important implications for deepening 
South Africa's new democracy. Engagement helps ensure that workers 
can hold those in authority directly and immediately accountable; that 
such accountability can be extended to the sphere of private economic 
decision-making; and that it can be exerted before a decision is made, 
preventing or amending an objectionable policy prior to its implementa-
tion. Engagement may ensure that workers reap greater benefits from 
their labour, and thereby contribute to increased trust, in turn encouraging 
higher quality work effort. Engagement may increase the flow of informa-
tion between all parties, which not only contributes to better - more 
informed - decision-making, but contributes to a climate of trust and 










































ENGJ',.GING THE STATE AND CAPITAL 
helps bind all parties to a policy and ensures their joint responsibility in 
bringing it about (Gelb and Bethlehem, 1998: 17). In short. engagement 
may slow down decision-making, but it will likely improve the quality of 
an outcome and vastly increase its legitimacy, while developing the par-
ticipants' intellectual and technical competencies. 
6 CONCLUSION 
Engagement holds out the possibility -- difficult as it may be to realise - of 
advancing worker's control over crucial economic decision-making, 
thereby deepening democracy and contributing to a transformative pro-
gram. The paradox is that such potential is realisable only through partici-
pation in and risking incorporation into the capitalist system. 
Labour faces a tall order. It must develop strategiC and feasible ap-
proaches to engagement at the work-place. industry and societal levels, 
and be in a position to synchronise these transformative initiatives. An 
approach that sees these as mutually reinforcing departures rather than 
as a series of discontinuous encounters with the state and capital -- can 
help ensure that labour's limited capacities are better marshalled towards 
achieving its goals. 
The South African labour movement. it has been said, has proven to be 
more adept at opening doors than walking through them. But the oppor-
tunities described in this article won't remain open for ever. The question 
posed above as to whether the institutions and processes of engagement 
are a passing fashion or enduring feature cannot yet be answered. But we 
will - sooner rather than later - know whether engagement has changed 
the relations between labour, capital and the state, and -- by extension -
the nature of South Africa's new democracy. 
In the meantime, the findings presented in this issue of Law, Democracy 
and Development make but a first assessment of engagement. Further 
detailed work and debate is needed by all who share an interest in labour 
and democracy. 
Sources 
Adler G and Webster E "Bargained Iiberalisation: The labour movement, 
policy-making and transition in Zambia and South Africa" (1997) Re-
search report commissioned by the Multinational Working Group on 
Labour Movements and Policy-Making in Africa for the Council for the 
Development of Social Science Research in Africa: Dakar 
Adler G and Webster E "Challenging transition theory: The labour move-
ment, radical reform and transition to democracy in South Africa" 
(1995) 23 (1) Politics and Society 
Baskin J "Corporatism: Some obstacles facing the South African labour 
movement" (1993) Centre for Policy Studies, Research Report no 30 
Baskin] "Labour in South Africa's transition to democracy: Concertation in 
a third world setting" in Adler G and Webster E (eds) Consolidating de-
mocracy in a liberalising world: Trade unions and transition in South Africa 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT . 
Baskin J "Labour relations policy and the politics of economic reform" 
(1998) Paper for the conference on the Politics of Economic Reform. 
University of Cape Town 
Baskin J "The trend towards bargained corporatism" (1993a) South African 
Labour Bulletin 17 (314) 
Bayat A Work. politics and power: An international perspective on workers' 
control and self-management (1991) Monthly Review Press New York 
Bird A and Schreiner G "COSATU at the crossroads: Towards tripartite 
corporatism or democratic socialism?" (1992) 16(6) South African La-
bour Bulletin 
Buhlungu S "Trade union responses to participatory management: a case 
study" (1996) Unpublished MA thesiS: University of the Witwatersrand 
CA WSON A Corporatism and political theory (1986) Blackwell Oxford 
COSATU "6th National Congress Resolutions" (1998) COSATU Johannes-
burg 
COSATU "Secretariat Report to COSATU 6th National Congress" (1997a) 
COSATU (September) Johannesburg 
COSATU "The report oj the September Commission on the future oj the 
unions to the Congress oj South AJrican Trade Unions" (1997) COSATU 
(August) Johannesburg 
Cronin J "The boat, the tap and the Leipzig way" (1992) The African Com-
munist 130 
Desai A and Habib A "Labour relations in transition: The rise oj corporatism 
in South Africa's automobile industry" (1996) University of York, De-
partment of Politics Working Paper no 13 
De Villiers R Forums and the future (1994) Doornfontein: Centre for Policy 
Studies 
Du Toit D "Corporatism and collective bargaining in a democratic South 
Africa" (1 995) Industrial Law Journal 1 6 
Etkind R "Rights and power: Failings of the new LRA" (1995) 19(2) South 
African Labour Bulletin 
Friedman S Building tomorrow tOday: African workers in trade unions, 1970-
1984 (1987) Ravan Press Johannesburg 
Friedman S and De Villiers R (eds) South Africa and Brazil: Two transitional 
states in comparative perspective (1996) Johannesburg: Centre for Policy 
Studies, Foundation for Global Dialogue, IDESP 
Friedman S and Shaw M "Power in partnership? Trade unions, forums and 
the transition" in Adler G and Webster E (eds) Consolidating democracy 
in a liberalising world: Trade unions and transition in South Africa (in 
press) Macmillan London 
Gelb S and Bethlehem L "Macro-economics for the masses?" (1998) Si-










































ENGAGrNGTHE STATE AND CAPITAL 
Harris L "South Africa's economic and social transformation: From 'no 
middle road' to 'no alternative'" (1993) Review of African Political Econ-
omy57 
Hirschsohn P Godfrey Sand Maree J "Muddling through tripartite indus-
trial policy: The textile and clothing and automobile sectors" (1997) Un-
published research report, NALEDI 
Kester G and Pinaud H (eds) Trade unions and democratic participation, 
Volume 1: Policies and strategies (l994) Paris and The Hague: Institute of 
Social Studies 
Kester G and Pinaud H (eds) Trade unions and democratic participation, 
Volume 2: Anarysis of experience (I 994a) Paris and The Hague: Institute 
of Social Studies 
Lagrange R "Work-place forums: some comments" in "Opinions on the 
new Labour Relations Bill" (1995) NALEDI Information Package 
Lehulere 0 "Social democracy and neo-Iiberalism: Social democrats in 
new clothes" (1996) Debate 1 
Lwoga C and Mapolu N 0 "Workers' participation and the management of 
public enterprise in Tanzania" Unpublished Mimeo Dar es Salaam 
Maphosa G J "Industrial democracy in Zimbabwe?" in Industrial sociology 
in the first decade of Zimbabwean independence (1992) Cheater A (ed) 
Harare University of Zimbabwe Publications 
Maree J "Trade unions and corporatism in South Africa" (l993) Transfor-
mation 21 
Marie B "COSATU faces crisis: 'Quick-fix' methods and organisational 
contradictions" (1992) 16(5) South African Labour Bulletin 
Marie B "Trade unions in the transition in South Africa: comments and 
questions on the organisational tasks facing the trade union movement" 
(1995), Paper produced for the project on "Trade unions and the transi· 
tion to democracy in South Africa" of the Albert Einstein Institution of 
Cambridge, Massachusetts and the Sociology of Work Unit, University of 
the Witwatersrand 
Panitch L Working class politics in crisis (1986) Verso London 
Pateman C Participation and democratic theory (1970) Cambridge Cam-
bridge University Press 
Pekkarinen J et al (eds) Social corporatism: A superior economic system? 
(1992) Clarendon Oxford 
Pityana S "Creative thinking can improve NED LAC's effectiveness" 
(l997a) Business Day 17 September 
Pityana S "NEDLAC: Government by collective bargaining?" (1997) New 
Nation 23 May. 
Pontussen J "Radicalization and retreat in Swedish social democracy" 
(1 988) New Left Review 165 
Rakner L "Trade unions in the processes of democratisation: a study of 
party labour relations in Zambia" (1992), Institute Bergen Chr Michelsen 










































.LAW,DEMOCRACY&DEVELO?1I1ENT .: . ..... j 
Rogers J and Streeck W "Work-place representation overseas: The works 
council story" (1994) in Freeman R (ed) Working under different rules 
Russell Sage Foundation New York 
Schauer H "Critique of co-determination" in Hunnius G Garson D and Case 
J (eds) Workers' control (1973) Vintage New York 
Schmitter P "Still the century of corporatism?" (1974) Review of Politics 36 
(1) 
Schmitter P and Lehmbruch G (eds) Trends towards corporatist intermedia-
tion (1979) Sage London 
Schregle J "Co-determination in the Federal Republic of Germany: A 
comparative view" (1978) 117(1) International Labour Review 
Schreiner G "Fossils from the past: Resurrecting and restructuring the 
National Manpower Commission" (1991) 16(1) South African Labour 
Bulletin 
Shivji I Class struggles in Tanzania (1976) Monthly Review Press New York 
Shivji I Law, state and the working class in Tanzania. c. 1920-1964 (1986) 
James Currey London 
Streeck W "Co-determination: After four decades" in Streeck W Social 
institutions and economic performance: Studies of industrial relations in 
advanced capitalist economies (1992) Sage Publications London 
Streeck W Public lecture presented to a workshop on co-determination 
sponsored by the South African Labour Bulletin, the Sociology of Work 
Unit and NALEDI (1994) 
Swenson P Fair shares: Unions, pay, and politics in Sweden and West Ger-
many (1989) Cornell University Press Ithaca 
Turner L Democracy at work: changing world markets and the future of 
labour unions (1 991) Corne.ll University Press Ithaca and London 
Vally B A social contract: The way forward? (1992) Phambili Books Johan-
nesburg 
Von Holdt K "From resistance to reconstruction: The changing role of 
trade unions" (1991) 15(6) South African Labour Bulletin 
Von Holdt K "The Mercedes Benz sleep-in" (1990) 15(4) South African 
Labour Bulletin 
Von Holdt K "Towards transforming SA industry: A 'reconstruction accord' 
between unions and the ANC?" (1991 a) 15(6) South African Labour Bul-
letin 
Webster E Cast in a racial mould: Labour process and trade unionism in the 
foundries (1985) Ravan Press Johannesburg 
Webster E "NEDLAC - corporatism of a special type?" (1995) 1 9(2) South 
African Labour Bulletin 
Weiss M "Institutional forms of workers' participation with special refer-
ence to the Federal Republic of Germany" (1986) Paper presented to 
the 7th World Congress of the International Industrial Relations Asso-
ciation Hamburg 1-4 September 
26 
R
ep
ro
du
ce
d 
by
 S
ab
in
et
 G
at
ew
ay
 u
nd
er
 li
ce
nc
e 
gr
an
te
d 
by
 th
e 
Pu
bl
is
he
r (
da
te
d 
20
09
).
